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The 1876 parliamentary year commenced and was concluded in Romania by 
an implied agreement of Liberals and Conservatives with respect to the artificial 
and burdensome character of the state, which they would take turns in running. 
On January 21, the Conservative Minister of Public Instruction and Religious Af-
fairs, Titu Maiorescu stated that, under the Organic Regulations (1831-1848), the 
country was wrapped up in a public outfit made out of customs that, except for a 
few ”detrimental principles”, were wholly compatible with the administrative re-
quirements of a modern state. Moreover, these customs and regulations had the 
comparative advantage of not furthering the emergence of political liberty, which 
was not yet considered desirable by the Romanian society. Between the Revolution 
of 1848 and the Constitution of 1866, Romanians found themselves politically ”un-
dressed”, and they had to cover themselves up with a new form of state, with a 
constitutional dress that did not suit them at all1. A couple of month later, the 
National Liberal Party formed a new government and called for elections that 
strengthened the position of its radical wing. On December 15, the Prime Minister 
Ion C. Brătianu echoed the statement of the former minister, now in opposition, 
and agreed that, without taking the time to reproduce ”the modes of production of 
a civilized society”, the Romanians ”draped” themselves in modern political 
”clothes” by merely copying the Western ”pattern of political organization” to-
gether with the entire legal apparatus that the original blueprint brought along. 
The leader of the Liberal Party admitted that he deserved to be counted among 
”the unfortunates” who, during and after the 1848 Revolution, had given the state 
a ”wonderful roof” but no foundations, since nothing significant had been done in 
the meantime by any government or political group in order to boost up agricul-
ture, industry and commerce. Instead, the only significant, if perverse, achieve-
ment of the generation that conducted the process of constitutional and legal mod-
ernization of the country was the creation of a broad category of professionals of 
the state trained to exploit the sole viable and tangible gross national income gen-
erated by the peasants’ labor2. 
What is surprising about this indirect dialogue is its bi-partisan character, 
rather than the issue under debate. During the same period (1864-1884), the Portu-
guese elite, as peripheral to modernity as the Romanian one, was engaged in 
similar disputes regarding the balance between a society still attached to the values 
and customs of the Ancient Regime and made out of a backward and illiterate 
                                                
1 Titu MAIORESCU, Discursuri parlamentare cu priviri asupra dezvoltării politice a României 
sub domnia lui Carol I, vol. I, Socec, Bucureşti, 1897, p. 413. 
2 Ion C. BRĂTIANU, Discursuri, scrisori, acte şi documente, vol. II, partea a II-a, Imprimeriile 
Independenţa, Bucureşti, 1912, pp. 107-111. 
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peasantry, on the one hand, and a dramatically liberal and progressive transforma-
tion of the institutional framework of the government, on the other hand1. Both in 
Portugal and in Romania, for instance, mandatory primary school education and 
the abolishment of death penalty were legal innovations introduced in the absence 
of any concern for mobilizing resources necessary to craft a national elementary 
school network or agencies capable of enforcing law and order. 
Were the Romanian Liberals, like other political elites from the periphery of 
modern Europe, just ”a class of importers”2 facing the difficult assignment of adjust-
ing a form of government and an ideal of political reform that they learned to ad-
mire elsewhere to a benighted and unyielding traditional society? It seems that the 
replication and the rapid multiplication of external forms of civilization, inspired by 
the legacy of the French Revolution and triggered by the events of 1848 failed, at least 
before 1876, to touch the Romanian social foundations in any significant way – immo-
bilized as they were in a permanent resistance to change. Indeed, Titu Maiorescu 
famously believed that the ”radical vice” of the Romanian culture of the 19th century 
was the ”untruthfulness”3 of the public life forms – be they political, economic, cul-
tural or of any other nature. These forms, acquired from the West, did not match the 
inbred ”essence” of the Romanian society. Parliament and the Constitution, elec-
tions and the free press, the academic world and the public education system, the 
museums and all the other Westernizing institutions, were all just ”pretences with 
no basis”, ”shapeless phantoms”, ”illusions without truth”, in short, forms without 
foundations4. Maoirescu’s claim was that the Liberals had produced the fruits of 
modernity without bothering to reproduce their rationale, their ”deeper historical 
fundament”. They merely strived to translate the ”appearances of the Western cul-
ture”, expecting to achieve freedom and form a modern representative regime out 
of this ”outside polish”5. But what exactly was the content that did not receive the 
proper forms, the foundations that refused to cast themselves in the mould of the 
liberal? Could these societal foundations, the ultimate and unreformed truth of the 
Romanian body politic be defined in a positive way?  
Thus far, we have learned what Romanians were not yet ready for. Reading 
Titu Maiorescu and Ion C. Brătianu, we simply find out that, in its state of authen-
ticity, the 19th century Romanian society was incompatible with alien forms like 
Constitutions, universities, modern bureaucracy or credit. Met with ironic skepti-
cism by Maiorescu6, the first attempt to establish what could have been this defini-
tive truth of Romanian politics is to be found in the Conservative Party program, 
issued on February 16, 1880 by Manolache Costache Epureanu. For the Conservative 
leader, the ”substance of truth” – to be opposed to the fallacious liberal ”wording” – 
was not, however, an essence, but rather an action: ”To observe properly the 
                                                
1 Antonio COSTA PINTO, Pedro TAVARES DE ALMEIDA, ”On Liberalism and the Emer-
gence of Civil Society in Portugal”, in Nancy BERMEO, Philip NORD (editors), Civil Society before 
Democracy. Lessons from Nineteenth-Century Europe, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, 2000, p. 7. 
2 I use the language of Bertrand BADIE, L’État importé. Essai sur l’occidentalisation de l’ordre 
politique, Fayard, Paris, 1982, p. 152. 
3 Titu MAIORESCU, ”În contra direcţiei de astăzi în cultura română”, in Critice, vol. I, 
Editura pentru Literatură, Bucureşti, 1967, p. 147. 
4 Ibidem, p. 151. 
5 Ibidem, p. 147.  
6 Titu MAIORESCU, Discursuri parlamentare cu priviri asupra dezvoltării politice a României 
sub domnia lui Carol I, vol. III, Socec, Bucureşti, 1899, p. 4. 
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principles of representative government”1. Despite Maiorescu’s historicism and 
philosophical pessimism, most of the Conservatives and even the majority of the 
Liberals would have agreed with such an assessment.  
It seems that in the European peripheral societies, where modernity was still 
overdue and industrialization was late to visit the 19th century2, the intellectual 
juxtapositions between form and foundation, illusion and reality, words and facts 
allowed for an artificial polarization of the political actors of the representative 
regime, between a ”red”, liberal and progressive Left and a reactionary, conser-
vative and traditionalist Right. Liberal partisans of the natural law and conserva-
tive proponents of historicism, in almost complete agreement as to the ways and 
means of government, could thus express their conflicting views in the press or 
in Parliament. The purpose of political competition was not to compare the 
merits of these stands, but to determine to which side the symbolic and social 
benefits of modernization should go. At the very beginning of the 20th century, 
Constantin Dobrogeanu-Gherea noticed, somehow against his Marxian criteria of 
analysis, that the Romanian elites did not represent particular and competing eco-
nomic or social interests, but merely protected and promoted the overall interests of 
a ”political industry”3 developed by a unified oligarchy located in Parliament. 
According to Ion C. Brătianu’s observation of 1876, the civil service itself was but a 
branch of this industry. In this respect, Romania was not so different from 19th cen-
tury Spain, where politics was completely neutral in terms of representing economic 
interests, and fully convergent in exploiting the state apparatus. Elections were won 
and lost according to the ability of the parties – embedded in the same social back-
ground – to mobilize the resources of the civil service and to set up territorial net-
works of patronage4. In the early 1880s, Petre P. Carp described as follows the proce-
dures of electoral mobilization that matched the Spanish ones to the letter: ”You 
would ask me, what does the prefect do? What does he do? Electioneering. What 
does the permanent committee do? Electioneering. What does the deputy prefect do? 
Electioneering. What does the mayor do? Electioneering. Our entire administration is 
nothing but a giant electoral device”5. Like in the neighboring Greece, the country 
was under the unquestioned authority of a parliamentary oligarchy, since politics was 
the exclusive trade of a limited number of prominent families and associated clien-
tele, organized in parties lacking the will and ability of mass mobilization and re-
solved to preserve the censitaire representative system, which qualified and classified 
voters in conformity with their income6. Hence, representative government did not 
represent the citizenry, but the convergence of interests between a cartel of landlords 
or land leasers (”agricultural industrialists” as they were called in the last two 
                                                
1 Ion BULEI, Conservatori şi conservatorism în România, Editura Enciclopedică, 2000, 
Bucureşti, p. 33. 
2 John R. LAMPE, ”Varieties of Unsuccessful Industrialization: The Balkan States Before 
1014”, in The Journal of Economic History, vol. 35, no. 1, 1975, pp. 56-85. 
3 Constantin DOBROGEANU-GHEREA, ”Despre oligarhia română”, in Opere complete, 
vol. V, Editura Politică, Bucureşti, 1978, p. 185. 
4 Juan J. LINZ, ”A Century of Politics and Interests in Spain”, in Suzanne BERGER (editor), 
Organizing Interests in Western Europe, Cambridge, University Press Cambridge, 1981, pp. 367-375. 
5 Constantin GANE, P.P. Carp şi locul său în istoria politică a ţării, vol. II, Editura Ziarului 
Universul, Bucureşti, 1936, p. 333. 
6 Nicos P. MOUZELIS, Politics in the Semi-Periphery. Early Parliamentarianism and Late 
Industrialisation in the Balkans and Latin America, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1986, p. 3. 
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decades of the century) and a conglomerate of urban and rural renters that lived of a 
double – and sometimes combined – exploitation of land and the public debt. 
In the Romanian state set up by the Constitution of 1866, this ”class of profes-
sional politicians”1 was the result of ”a patriotic agreement over the relations of 
production in agriculture”2: the nation-state had to be planned and built from the 
roof down by political engineers recruited from the traditional privileged social 
strata, with the explicit exclusion of the peasantry from any participation in public 
life. Undoubtedly, such an approach to politics was anti-Toquevillian, since it in-
tended to make use of the state as the driving force of modernization, and did not 
consider the involvement any form of civil society into the process. Romanian radi-
cals shared the general compunction of their European fellow Liberals about the 
right of free association, behind which they saw the potential danger of a democ-
ratic and popular mobilization against the liberal state and its parliamentary oli-
garchy. The Orleanu law of 1909, prohibiting the creation of trade unions and pro-
fessional associations of employees, and suppressing the right to strike3 was 
promoted by a National Liberal government and voted by a Liberal majority. As in 
Italy4, equally peripheral to modernity, Romanian Liberals showed no real concern 
for establishing a constitutional system based on checks and balances and were se-
duced instead by the idea of a strong government, able to reshape the institutional 
framework of the polity and to advance gradual social reform. Romanian progres-
sive politicians understood the later as an incremental ”solidarity” between the 
state and the rural majority through such instruments of self-improvement as gen-
eralized education and easy access to credit. 
Upward social mobility was acceptable, if not desirable, but only as an indi-
vidual solution. Therefore, corporate interests or political militancy were not 
deemed legitimate agencies of social promotion. Taking advantage of public in-
struction and national cheap capital was by 1900, according to Ionel I.C. Brătianu, 
the only reasonable avenue of political enfranchisement5. The social philosophy of 
Romanian liberalism was indeed summarized at the turn of the century by the 
principle ”By ourselves”, which expressed the trust, shared by most European Lib-
erals6, in self-help and personal improvement as devices of social advancement. 
Even the conservative Maiorescu agreed in a private note that the Constitution can 
be also viewed as ”a training school for the people”, which would be encouraged 
with time ”to be mindful of itself”, to mature politically and ”to rise above itself by 
its own merits”7. Yet constitutionalism may be a learning process, but is hardly a 
political solution, as it cannot expand the scope of representation in a natural way. 
In reality, both Liberals and Conservatives interpreted the rules of exclusion 
                                                
1 Constantin DOBROGEANU-GHEREA, op. cit., p. 178. 
2 Ibidem, pp. 180-181. 
3 Apostol STAN, Mircea IOSA, Liberalismul politic în România, Editura Enciclopedică, 
Bucureşti, 1996, p. 355. 
4 Alberto Mario BANTI, ”Public Opinion and Associations in Nineteenth-Century Italy”, in 
Nancy BERMEO, Philip NORD (editors), op. cit., pp. 43-44. 
5 Discursurile lui I.I.C. Brătianu, ed. de George FOTINO, vol. I, Aşezământul Cultural 
I.I.C. Brătianu, Bucureşti, 1933, p. 249. 
6 Allan MITCHELL, ”Bourgeois Liberalism and Public Health: A Franco-German Com-
parison”, in Jürgen KOCKA, Allan MITCHELL (editors), Bourgeois Society in Nineteenth-Century 
Europe, Berg, Oxford, 1993, p. 347. 
7 Titu MAIORESCU, Însemnări zilnice, vol. I, Socec, Bucureşti, 1937, p. 132. 
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engrained into representative government as a fallout of the hierarchy of ranks 
brought forth by the Organic Regulations. Not surprisingly, Ion C. Brătianu em-
phasized that the post-medieval assemblies of orders, the general assembly of the 
Organic Regulations, the legislative body introduced by the Paris Convention and 
the Statute of 1864 belonged all to an uninterrupted representative tradition which 
buttressed ”a very liberal regime and, I might say, a parliamentary one” that dis-
tinguished the Romanians from other neighboring people, condemned in the past 
to ”absolute despotism”1. It was precisely this sense of the historical continuity of 
political representation that slowed down the pace of democratization, which was 
more likely to take off in societies that move directly from ”despotism” to parlia-
mentarism, as Stein Rokkan argued2. 
Everywhere in 19th century Europe, the liberal dilemma was how to set a po-
litical agenda simultaneously distant from both aristocratic privileges and democ-
ratic expectations. For their part, Romanian Liberals proved themselves to be more 
concerned with the necessity of containing any popular taste for electoral democ-
racy that Alexandru Ioan Cuza may have stirred up than by the landowners’ con-
servatism. The coup d’état of 1866 was thus prepared and enacted by various 
”red” groups in collusion with most of the reactionary circles. This ”monstrous 
coalition”, as its contemporary critics called it, aimed at restoring the representa-
tive logic of 1831, threatened by Cuza’s flirt with the idea of universal suffrage. In 
addition, just like George III in the first part of his reign3, the prince used to ap-
point cabinets of his own choice, ignoring by and large the patronage networks 
controlled either by radical and moderate liberal factions or by conservative 
bosses. Hence, the main purpose of the constitutional arrangement of 1866 was to 
reverse the political consequences of the Paris Convention (1858) and of the Statute 
imposed in 1864 by Cuza. If the avowed purpose of the Constitution of 1866 was to 
firmly establish a number of public freedoms, it was also meant to cancel the very 
possibility of an autonomous peasant electoral constituency that could have 
weighted on the decision-making process. To be sure, in the ad-hoc assemblies of 
1857, which were highly instrumental in shaping up the politics of modernization, 
peasant deputies made 20% of the membership. Ten years after, the Liberals were 
still haunted by the memory of the peasant deputies speaking on their own behalf 
and trying to include the rural question on the public agenda. Liberals strongly be-
lieved that peasants were not politically qualified to have representatives of their 
own. Hence, it was rather the radicals and not the conservative landowners that 
committed themselves to blocking on that particular occasion the issue of landless 
peasants working on large estates in onerous conditions4, an issue that loomed lar-
ger than any over Romanian society other until the land reform was accomplished 
in the aftermath of World War I. 
By removing the peasantry from the public sphere in 1866, the parliamentary 
oligarchy reinforced the social power relations and the social hierarchies estab-
lished in 1831 by the Organic Regulations, still regarded in 1876 by Titu Maiorescu 
                                                
1 Ion C. BRĂTIANU, Acte şi cuvântări, vol. III, Cartea Românească, Bucureşti, 1941, p. 178. 
2 Peter FLORA (editor), State Formation, Nation – Building, and Mass Politics in Europe. The 
Theory of Stein Rokkan Based on His Collected Works, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999, p. 249. 
3 J.G.A. POCOCK, Virtue, Commerce, and History. Essays on Political Thought and History, 
Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985, pp. 81-82. 
4 Apostol STAN, Mircea IOSA, op. cit., p. 69. 
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as a constitutional arrangement entirely compatible with the liberal requirements 
of representative government. Until universal suffrage was introduced in 1919, the 
political elite of the country did not undergo any structural changes in terms of re-
cruitment and public career. The four-class electoral system ensured the sway of a 
few hundred families and their clientele over the Senate and two of the electoral 
classes entitled to vote for the Lower House of the Parliament. Thus, the Romanian 
parliamentary oligarchy followed the logic of a paternalist and authoritarian system 
of government, which, in the 19th century, characterized most post-Byzantine coun-
tries entrenched in the Orthodox cultural tradition1.  
”Good institutions are the foundation of the very existence of the state. They 
are the necessary condition for its progress towards civilization and a thriving fu-
ture”2. This statement, taken from a 1832 memorandum on the implementation of 
the Organic Regulations in Moldavia, uttered a conviction shared by most Roma-
nian politicians during the age of modernization: good institutions, embodied by 
the bureaucracy of a highly centralized state and kept together by a stable political 
elite, should be a prerequisite for the progress of a society that was striving to catch 
up with the present. Representative government rooted in an exclusive système cen-
sitaire was by definition the institutional instrument that consolidated a category of 
professionals of modernization, as liberals used to regard themselves. 
One of the questions to which nation-building, as a process designed and car-
ried out by Romanian Liberals in the second half of the 19th century, did not an-
swer was whether the institutions and the legislation of a modern state were able 
to transform a society of dependent subjects into a community of free citizens. In 
front of the prince who distributed justice, the boyar who owned the land, and the 
Church that discouraged both work and knowledge3, the people of the Ancient Re-
gime could represent themselves only as subjects. The social role imparted to them 
was to obey whoever preceded them in the hierarchy of ranks and status and to 
command to those beneath them. The liberal state replaced this type of obedience 
with another, whose mechanics of compliance and leadership functioned accord-
ing to the place assigned to each individual in the institutional geography of repre-
sentative government. The progressive elite itself approached modernity with a 
massive handicap: it was not the social product of the revolution, but rather the 
offspring of old privileges. Thus ”red” politicians, be they radicals or moderates, 
were not, as a group, genetically distinct from the Conservatives. The official and 
gradual abolition of medieval privileges between 1848-1866 transformed the tradi-
tional ”dominant class” into a modern ”ruling class”, to use the language of 
Gaetano Mosca4. For the parliamentary oligarchy of the 19th century, moderniza-
tion was first and foremost a problem of political conversion: how to replace a ver-
tical hierarchy of ranks (determined jointly by landowning and by the position 
held at the Court) with a horizontal aggregate of elites (parliamentary, academic, 
                                                
1 See Andrew C. JANOS, East Central Europe in the Modern World. The Politics of the Borderlands 
from Pre- to Postcommunism, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2000, pp. 45-48. 
2 Vlad GEORGESCU, Mémoires et projets de réforme dans les Principautés roumaines, 1831-1848. 
Répertoire et textes, A.I.E.S.E.E., Bucureşti, 1972, p. 37. 
3 Daniel BARBU, Bizanţ contra Bizanţ. Explorări în cultura politică românească, Nemira, 
Bucureşti, 2001, pp. 89-134. 
4 Gaetano MOSCA, Elementi di scienza politica, UTET, Torino, 1982, pp. 608-632, 929-940, 
1003-1042. 
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professional, commercial, landed, and administrative)? The political engines of 
this transformation were first the parliamentary factions and, later, the parties. As 
Petre P. Carp admitted in April 1876, ”the essence of the constitutional whirl is the 
rule of the parties”1. The oligarchic party with a limited and hand picked constitu-
ency became the liberal form of the privileged order of the Ancient Regime. 
Approaching modernity as a process of institutional design and political con-
version, the Liberals exerted themselves to substitute the ancient power relations 
marshaled by the Court and underpinned by land ownership with a method of 
gouvernementalité2 whose mission was to replace real estate with the state as their 
main economic asset. This is why the Conservatives interpreted the founding of 
the National Bank in 1880 and the generalization of the instruments of credit as an 
attack on property, as a fraudulent and interested devaluation of real estates3. Al-
most two hundred years before, the establishment of the Bank of England pro-
duced the same reaction within the Tory circles worried by the Whig decision to 
substitute the real value of land with the nominal value of paper money, which re-
lied only on the belief in the solvability of the state4. In short, after 1866 the modern 
state was for the Liberals (and the government supported or inspired by them) a 
way to free their pervasive social domination from the dictatorship of the land and 
to craft a political nation out of illiterate and subjected peasants. 
On December 9, 1905, Ion I.C. Brătianu drew in a parliamentary discourse a 
short history of the party whose president he became three years later: ”The Na-
tional Liberal Party was not born as a spontaneous and theoretical entity, as a mere 
scholarly conception … The National Liberal Party emerged as the expression of a 
real and major need of our state and people. It was constantly the agency that ful-
filled Romania’s vital necessities and the first need it had to respond to, the one 
that preceded and encompassed all others, the one from which it took even its na-
tional-liberal name, was the need to warrant the national existence of the Romani-
ans”5. Here, the nation does not appear to have an explicit ethnic meaning, being 
regarded rather as a surrogate of citizenship. This explains why the discourse on 
political capacity, peculiar to 19th century European liberalism6, was relatively in-
conspicuous in the Romanian liberal milieu. Accordingly, the electoral reform bill 
of 1884, which reduced the number of electoral classes from four to three and 
enlarged the electoral body, was presented by the official paper of the party as a 
proof of the liberal trust in the nation, and not as sanctioning the improvement of 
the level of individual qualification for voting7. 
                                                
1 Constantin GANE, op. cit., p. 189. 
2 I use the term as explained by Michel FOUCAULT, ”La gouvernementalité”, in Dits et 
Écrits, vol. III, Gallimard, Paris, 1994, pp. 635-657. 
3 Apostol STAN, Mircea IOSA, op. cit., pp. 214-217. 
4 J.G.A. POCOCK, op. cit., pp. 196-197. 
5 Ion BULEI, op. cit., p. 16. The theoretical inconsistency of Romanian liberalism as assumed 
by Ion C. Brătianu is indirectly confirmed by a somewhat discouraging attempt to find elements of 
clasical liberal thought in Romanian politicians that called themselves liberals: Victoria F. BROWN, 
”The Adaptation of Western Political Theory in a Peripheral State: the Case of Romanian 
Liberalism”, in Stephen FISCHER-GALATI, Radu R. FLORESCU, George R. URSUL (editors), 
Romania Between East and West. Historical Essays in Memory of Constantin C. Giurescu, East 
European Monographs, Boulder, 1982, pp. 269-301. 
6 Alan S. KAHAN, Liberalism in the Nineteenth-Century Europe. The Political Culture of Limited 
Suffrage, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2003, pp. 5-8. 
7 Românul, XXVII, 10 aprilie 1883, p. 325. 
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The boyar factions formed around 1800, both in Wallachia and in Moldavia, 
under the generic name of ”national parties” envisioned the nation under the politi-
cal features yielded by the French Revolution. A memorandum of 1818-1819 men-
tioned for instance the ”national bond” that fiscal equality, brought forth by the 
abolition of privileges and immunities, could create for the all Romanians1. Accord-
ingly, an anonymous liberal author of the 1830s wrote, ”That place where a society 
of many people is dwelling is called fatherland, because of the name of the fathers 
and forefathers who lived there as a society. It is not the land that should be called a 
fatherland, but the political dwelling, that is the society of those who live together, 
making use of and sharing each other, whose sharing is bound by love and the com-
mon interests and purposes … therefore we could not say that Romania is our fa-
therland, because we haven’t had and we still don’t have here a society that we may 
share and make use of”2. Thus, ”fatherland” is not a place charged with the past of 
an ethnic group, but the ”political dwelling” of a society that is experiencing the 
fullness of civil rights and duties and is marshaled by the sense of a common good.  
The very term liberalism was imported into Romanian around 1828 by one of 
the most cogent reformist political thinkers of Moldavia, Ionică Tăutul3. The 
pre-revolutionary generations imagined the nation as a sovereign community with 
a place of its own in the jus publicum europaeum and held together by the mechanics 
of representation. The proclamation of Islaz of June 9 1848, which served as a revo-
lutionary constitution for a few months found that truth, political ideas and knowl-
edge were universal and could not be subject to any limitation of class, status or 
ethnicity. According to Ioan D. Negulici, a revolutionary philologist that published 
immediately after 1848 a dictionary of neologisms to be used as a progressive po-
litical lexicon, the liberal was ”the protector of humanity and of the rights of the na-
tions”4. Political capacity was then deemed by the liberal successors of the Revolu-
tion of 1848 to be eminently indivisible and, consequently, something to be taken 
into account between (and not within) national communities. In a speech of No-
vember 22, 1876 I.C. Brătianu argued that the holder of political qualification was, 
or should be, the country itself: if the people shall not be educated swiftly, the 
more educated nations would eventually assimilate the Romanians5. The National 
Liberal Party, created one year earlier, assumed precisely this task of being the po-
litical epitome of the Romanian nation.  
When they decided in 1866 to postpone indefinitely the extension of political 
rights – even in the restricted form of the equal vote for all the literate capital or la-
bor owners adopted by other liberal regimes of South-Eastern Europe – the Roma-
nian liberals have resorted to the nation as an intuitive and natural substitute for 
citizenship. Thus, in 1891, the Liberals honored the passing away of Ion C. Brătianu 
with a public declaration emphasizing that the National Liberal Party was nothing 
else that the ”nation’s consciousness”6. Ten years later, Constantin Stere defended 
                                                
1 Valeriu ŞOTROPA, Proiectele de constituţie, programele de reforme şi petiţiile de drepturi din 
ţările române Editura Academiei, Bucureşti, 1976, p. 47. 
2 Paul CORNEA, Originile romantismului românesc. Spiritul public, mişcarea ideilor şi literatura 
între 1780-1840, Minerva, Bucureşti, 1972, p. 208. 
3 Klaus BOCHMANN, Der politisch-soziale Wortschatz des Rumänischen von 1821 bis 1850, 
Akademie Verlag, Berlin, 1979, p. 68. 
4 Ibidem, pp. 141-142. 
5 I.C. BRĂTIANU, op. cit., p. 218. 
6 Apostol STAN, Mircea IOSA, op. cit., p. 276. 
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the collective enrolment of the socialist militants in the liberal organizations, which 
some considered as a political betrayal, with the argument that ”only this party will 
accomplish the ideal of a great Romanian nation, master of its own destiny”1. Since 
they were not willing to grant all Romanians political participation, and were jeal-
ously sharing with the Conservatives the reign of a very restricted representative 
government, the Liberals placed democratic citizenship and the national idea in the 
same ideal political frame. Only when the ”Romanian national existence” was 
achieved (a rather unlikely event before 1918), could universal suffrage be an op-
tion. The individual capacity to vote should have been the historical outcome of the 
definitive qualification of the nation on the international arena.  
In taking away fundamental political rights from the citizens and assigning 
them to a would-be unified nation, the founders of the modern Romanian state, 
Liberal and Conservative alike, shaped a Rechtsstaat in which not the individual 
rights but the positive laws were the only guarantees for the preservation and en-
forcement of public liberties2. Hence, the individual citizen was not conceived as a 
natural agent of liberty, but as a subject of a rule of law that granted him that 
amount of freedom and those rights compatible with the interests of state embod-
ied by the Liberal-Conservative parliamentary oligarchy. It is only after 1888 that 
the liberal ideology welcomed, especially in some of Ionel I.C. Brătianu’s state-
ments, the idea of a nation made out of rights and pictured it as a community of 
citizens summoned up by the liberal project of modernization. Therefore, by the 
turn of the century, the topics of agrarian and electoral reforms, of Romanianness 
and democratic citizenship merged in a single liberal discourse close to the model 
of social nation3. 
To sum up, the Romanian liberal elite did not cope with modernization as a 
social advancement of civil and political rights, but as a mere language of political 
change. Whereas the bourgeois 19th century understood modernity as power over 
things, Romanian Liberals approached it as a power over words. They were reluc-
tant, or unable, to develop a culture of experience, preferring to wrap themselves 
in a culture of discourse. ”Political matters concern them to the highest degree”, 
observed Jacques Poumay, consul general of Belgium, in 1867, ”For ten years now 
the Romanians have been writing nothing more than newspaper articles and these 
articles, when they are not written by personalities, develop but empty theories, 
lacking the sanction of experience”4. 
If this was the case, was modernization more than a name given to the sponta-
neous economic, societal, institutional and intellectual transformations that oc-
curred in Romania after the Revolution of 1848? It seems that modernization, as a 
more or less delayed but constant project of Romanian political elites, was not just 
a process that directed the life and work of a backward society to the future. Mod-
ernization also included those sets of behaviors, attitudes, practices and words 
whose significance was never contemporary with itself, but was fed by meanings 
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that preceded it1. In other words, the path followed by Romania in the 19th century 
was determined not only by the revolutionary breakthrough of 1848, but also by 
the economic, political and cultural practices the Revolution stood against. 
Somehow, the political idiom of Romanian elites was trapped between this in-
vasive past and a future they were unprepared to figure. As soon as it was gradu-
ally included in the public discourse, national history itself became more an argu-
ment for the present than the shared scholarly memory of a common past. For in-
stance, Titu Maiorescu, uttered his parliamentary speeches facing the past: in his 
capacity of legislator and minister, he claimed he was actually doing ”contempo-
rary history”2, not politics. For their part, Liberals also learned that politics might 
be a useful anticipation of the past. Hence, the failure of the Revolution of 1848 be-
came history. When writing in 1850 Românii supt Mihai Voevod Viteazul the then ex-
iled Nicolae Bălcescu wrote in fact contemporary history, trying to bestow on the 
Revolution the past it was missing. The official Romanian historiography of the 
20th century regards Michael the Brave as the eminent unifier of the ethnic nation, a 
herald of the making of Greater Romania in 1918. For Bălcescu, the prince of 1600 
was a retrospective liberal hero who ”by himself” and against all odds tried to lay 
the foundation of a political society out of dispersed and conflicting elements. A 
long national history of social and political subjection was no longer viewed as be-
ing discordant with the liberal values, but as the epic project of the political nation. 
After 1848, history was the continuous present3 of liberal politics.  
Taking in as milestones the Organic Regulations, the Revolution of 1848, and 
Cuza’s authoritarian regime, the interpretation of recent history espoused by the 
parliamentary oligarchy was, probably, nothing more than a method to avoid fac-
ing a basic dilemma: how could a modern and liberal state embed itself in a society 
not made out of Liberals and ignorant of what individual rights and freedoms are? 
Or, rephrasing the question, is a new and unfinished state able to produce free citi-
zens by means of positive law?  
The original liberal constitutional optimism fed by the democratic messianism 
of Nicolae Bălcescu and Simion Bărnuţiu included political representation in the 
sphere of natural rights as a universal franchise the liberal state had to warrant in 
its capacity of historical commissioner of the ”law of liberty”4. In the spirit of the 
French Revolution of February 1848, Nicolae Bălcescu incorporated universal suf-
frage5 into the intellectual heritage of Romanian Liberals. Still, the liberal factions, 
radical and moderate altogether, were disturbed by the anti-parliamentary inclina-
tion of Prince Cuza and by his will to see that the rural majority had a ”share in the 
political society”, by expanding the use of civil, social and political rights beyond 
traditional qualifications of status and wealth. Hence, after 1866, they abandoned 
any reference to universal suffrage. In this respect, Romanian Liberals followed in-
stinctively in the footsteps of their German counterparts who, despite the radical 
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positions adopted in 1848 by the Parliament of Frankfurt, reluctantly accepted the 
general enfranchisement of the electorate of the Empire undertook by the conser-
vative chancellor Bismarck1. 
Quite predictably, one of the most radical revolutionaries of 1848, 
Constantin A. Rosetti initiated an electoral reform bill thirty five years after, which 
created a single electoral class made up of all literate people. Nonetheless, only 35 
out of his 132 fellow liberal members of Parliament supported this initiative2. Within 
a year, the National Liberal government, led by Ion C. Brătianu, another one-time 
radical revolutionary, promoted its own bill, reducing the number of electoral classes 
from four to three and modestly enhancing the weight of the indirect peasant vote. 
This way, Brătianu showed that he meant every word when, on January 12, 1880, he 
rejected the right wing opposition’s accusations of radicalism, with this statement: 
”I’m a conservative as well”3. Dissatisfied with a faltering liberal leadership that had 
transformed a revolutionary ideal into an ”untrue illusion”, C.A. Rosetti left the 
party. Ironically, it took for a moderate liberal (and a former member of the February 
11, 1866 government that disposed of Cuza’s reforms) to affirm in his presidential 
program of 1892 that the enforcement of the rule of law would necessarily lead to 
universal suffrage with proportional representation, an ideal – as Dimitrie A. Sturdza 
put it – that could not be separated from the intellectual history of Romanian liberal-
ism4. The National Liberal congress of 1906 contemplated only a limited electoral en-
franchisement, and the congress of 1913 pleaded for ”the single electoral class of the 
literate people”5 that had been denied to C.A. Rosetti thirty years before. A year later, 
as the war broke out, Ionel I.C. Brătianu declared that out of patriotism and in view 
of the international situation, any political reforms, especially the electoral one, 
should be postponed6. The nation as a subject of international law must take prece-
dence over the nation as a community of citizens7. It is Stein Rokkan’s contention 
that whenever a state considers its independence at risk, the government of that state 
feels entitled to slow down the pace of democratization8. 
It was only in the spring of 1917, on an official visit to revolutionary Petrograd 
as President of the Council of Ministers, that Ionel Brătianu made public the irrevo-
cable decision of the Liberals to introduce universal suffrage and implement a fair 
agrarian reform as soon as the war ended9. Faced with the demise of Russian au-
tocracy and the breakdown of the bureaucratic and military oligarchies that 
propped up its survival beyond any political logic, Romanian Liberals understood 
that the only way to avoid a revolutionary completion of the process of moderniza-
tion they were in charge of since 1848 was to reshape the representative regime on 
the basis of universal suffrage. The solution may have seemed only fair and de-
mocratic at the end of a conflagration that was sustained mostly by the peasantry, 
but the reasoning behind it was utterly conservative. Universal suffrage was a 
revolution from above in the framework of the liberal state, revolution that the 
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Liberals hoped to tame and turn into their advantage. In the November 1919 elec-
tions, organized by general Arthur Văitoianu, head of a crypto-liberal government, 
the peasants were for the first time since 1857 direct voters. Consequently, they 
cast their ballots for the newly founded Peasant Party, which won close to an abso-
lute majority (46.30%), as a natural political embodiment of the social nation. 
Nonetheless, the National Liberal Party received in the Old Kingdom and in Bes-
sarabia 21.38% of the votes1, a decent performance that announced their upcoming 
return to the helm of a state they were not prepared to let go. 
However, from the making of Greater Romania in 1918 to its disbanding by 
the communist regime in 1948, the National Liberal Party was, politically, a living 
dead2. Over this period, six liberal governments were in power for eleven years. A 
liberal government reshuffled most of the public institutions and tailored the Con-
stitution in 1923 so as to acknowledge the territorial and political transformation 
brought forth by World War I. In 1926, the same government introduced a Fas-
cist-styled electoral law that repealed any democratic virtues universal suffrage 
might have promised. Another liberal government was even credited with the eco-
nomic boom of 1934-1938. Except that both governments were liberal only by 
name. In fact, their policies were anti-liberal. Whenever called to form the govern-
ment, the National Liberal Party promoted protectionism, faked elections, sus-
pended civil rights, dissolved associations, repressed the opposition, silenced the 
press, and evaded any parliamentary control. Ultimately, the Party apparatus and 
most of its leadership were instrumental in the reversal of representative democ-
racy by King Carol II in 1938.  
At the end of the Great War, the liberal parliamentary oligarchy was com-
pletely consumed by its experience of managing a state built from its constitutional 
cover down to national foundations that did not rest on individual rights and free-
doms. Both the war that had laid the responsibility for the survival of the nation on 
the peasant majority, and the example set by the Russian revolution of February 
1917 compelled the Romanian Liberals to revisit their own revolutionary origins 
and to fulfill their initial democratic agenda. Finally, the past established itself as 
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